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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. The plaintiff-appellee is Robert Pearson dba Robert Pearson Construction 
(referred to herein as "Mr. Pearson"). 
2. The defendant-appellant is Suzanne J. Lamb (referred to herein as "Mrs. 
Lamb"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Order from the Utah Supreme 
Court dated July 21, 2004, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from the Final 
Order and Judgment entered by the district court on or about July 28, 2004, ruling in 
favor of Mr. Pearson on his claims for breach of contract and mechanics' lien foreclosure, 
and against Mrs. Lamb on her counterclaims for breach of contract, and awarding Mr. 
Pearson his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as the "successful party" under Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-18(1). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Pearson offers the following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on 
page one of the Brief of Appellant, as it more accurately captures the essence of the 
issues before this Court: 
ISSUE NO, 1: Does Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e) prevent Mr. Pearson from 
enforcing his mechanics' lien, and require the reversal of that portion of the Final 
Judgment and Order ruling in favor of Mr. Pearson on his mechanics' Hen foreclosure 
claim and awarding him his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs? 
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Sub-Issue No. 1(a): Did the district court correctly conclude that Mrs. 
Lamb waived whatever rights she may have had under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) to 
challenge Mr. Pearson's right to enforce and foreclose upon his mechanics' lien, by (i) 
failing to assert such rights as an affirmative defense in her original (or amended) 
Answer, (ii) voluntarily stipulating, on or about April 12, 2004, that Mr. Pearson 
complied with all requirements for perfecting and foreclosing upon a mechanics' lien, 
and submitting the stipulation to the district court before trial, and/or (iii) failing to assert 
such rights as a defense at trial, or in a timely post-trial motion? 
Sub-Issue No. 1(b): Did the district court correctly conclude that Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e) provides a mere statutory affirmative defense to enforcement 
of a mechanics' lien, and is not a jurisdictional provision? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, "according the trial court no 
particular deference." Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 11, 54 
P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). The 
district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, however, and should be 
reversed only when they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or this Court 
reaches a firm conviction that an error has been made. See Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT 
App 380, % 17, 80 P.3d 553, 558. 
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed "for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." Board of Ed. of 
Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, % 1, 194 P.3d 234, 235. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes are relevant to the issues raised on appeal:1 
1. The Utah Mechanics' Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et. seq. 
("Mechanics' Lien Act"), particularly Sections 38-1-1 l(4)(a) & (e) and Section 38-1-
18(1). 
2. The Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-11-101 et seq. ("Residential Lien Act"), particularly Section 38-11-107 and 
Sections 38-1 l-204(4)(a) and (4)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is about general principles of fairness and justice, and the need to 
preserve the integrity of our judicial system. It is about holding persons responsible for 
their financial and contractual obligations to others, and for the positions they freely and 
voluntarily take in judicial proceedings. It is about preventing persons from taking 
calculated risks in litigation, and then seeking to retract from those calculated risks when 
the outcome proves unfavorable. 
After a full bench trial, the district court determined that (i) Mr. Pearson had a 
binding, enforceable oral contract with Mrs. Lamb and her late husband to remodel one 
of their many rental properties in the Park City, Utah, area, (ii) he fully performed his 
obligations under this contract and provided valuable construction services to Mrs. Lamb 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures, the relevant 
provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act and the Residential Lien Act are set forth verbatim 
at Addendum 1. 
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in a reasonably prompt and acceptable manner, and (iii) he was entitled to be fully 
compensated for his work. Mrs. Lamb does not challenge these rulings on appeal. 
The district court further determined, based in part on the carefully drafted pre-
trial stipulation of the parties, that Mr. Pearson had properly perfected and maintained a 
mechanics' lien against the subject rental property, and that he was entitled to foreclose 
upon that lien and be reimbursed for all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs he 
incurred in pursuing this action. Having unsuccessfully gambled at trial and lost, Mrs. 
Lamb now seeks a ruling from this Court that her pre-trial stipulation was meaningless, 
that Mr. Pearson was not, in fact, entitled to maintain, enforce or foreclose upon his 
mechanics' lien, and that she should not therefore be required to pay the award of 
attorneys' fees and costs. Such legal maneuvering should not be allowed, and the district 
court's Final Judgment and Order should be affirmed. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Mrs. Lamb is a California resident, owning various rental properties in the 
State of Utah, including a single family home located at 2547 Holiday Ranch Loop Road, 
Park City, Utah ("Park Meadows Property"). See Memorandum Decision at 3-4, f 2, R. 
at 0228-0229. 
2. Mr. Pearson is, and was at all relevant times, a licensed contractor in the 
State of Utah. See id. at 3, % 1, R. at 228. 
3. Between approximately August 2001 and July 2002, Mr. Pearson 
performed remodeling work at the Park Meadows Property pursuant to an oral contract 
with Mrs. Lamb. See id. at 5-10, ffi[ 6-15, R. at 230-35. 
A 
4, On or about July 19, 2002, after Mrs. Lamb refused to compensate Mr. 
Pearson for the remodeling work he performed at the Park Meadows Property, Mr. 
Pearson filed a notice of mechanics' lien against the Park Meadows Property. See id, at 
10, K 17, R. at 235. 
5- Mr. Pearson filed a Complaint in the Third District Court in and for Summit 
County, State of Utah, on or about October 24, 2002, asserting claims against Mrs. Lamb 
for mechanics' lien foreclosure and breach of contract based on Mrs. Lamb's failure and 
refusal to compensate him for the remodeling work he performed at the Park Meadows 
Property. See Complaint, R. at 0001-0009. 
6. Mrs. Lamb filed her original Answer on or about December 20, 2002, 
denying Mr. Pearson's claims for relief. At no point in this Answer did Mrs. Lamb 
assert, as an affirmative defense or otherwise, that Mr. Pearson failed to comply with the 
requirements of the Mechanics' Lien Act, or that the district court lacked the authority to 
hear his mechanics' lien foreclosure claim. Indeed, she expressly acknowledged the 
district court's jurisdiction with respect to that claim, asserting that she "should be 
awarded [her own] attorneys' fees, costs and expenses" under the Mechanics' Lien Act. 
See Answer at 2, % 6, R. at 0013-0017.2 
Mrs. Lamb filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on or about February 16, 2002, 
adding counterclaims against Mr. Pearson for breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. See Amended Complaint and 
Counterclaim, R. at 0032-42. Mrs. Lamb did not modify the substance of her Answer, 
however, or raise any new affirmative defenses, and still did not challenge the district 
court's ability to resolve Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien foreclosure claim. See id. 
Indeed, she reasserted her own right to recover attorneys9 fees and costs under the 
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7. On or about April 1, 2004, Michael Petrogeorge, counsel for Mr. Pearson, 
and David Thompson, counsel for Mrs. Lamb, engaged in a conference call regarding 
potential pre-trial stipulations. At that time, Mr. Thompson indicated that (i) Mrs. Lamb 
viewed this case as a simple breach of contract case, (ii) she challenged only Mr. 
Pearson's entitlement to payment, (iii) she was not interested in defending the case based 
on a failure to comply with the statutory requirements of the Mechanics' Lien Act, and 
(iv) because she wanted to simplify the proceedings, she was willing to stipulate and 
agree that Mr. Pearson fully complied with all statutory requirements. See Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant Lamb's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and 
Objection to Proposed Judgment at 6-7, n. 5, R. at 0395-0396. 
8. Thereafter, Mr. Petrogeorge prepared a draft stipulation containing a 
detailed, multi-paragraphed stipulation setting forth Mr. Pearson's compliance with 
specific statutory requirements. Mr. Thompson rejected Mr. Petrogeorge's original draft, 
proposing a broader stipulation. See id. 
9. On or about April 12, 2004, the parties filed with the district court a fully 
executed document entitled Stipulations of Fact and Admissibility of Exhibits 
("Stipulation"), agreeing, in relevant part, as follows: 
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the statutory procedural 
requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a 
mechanics9 lien, and the Notice of Claim of Lien filed with 
the Summit County Recorder's office on or about June 19, 
2002, meets these statutory procedural requirements; Mrs. 
Lamb does not defend against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' 
statute, once again acknowledging the district court's jurisdiction to hear and resolve 
the mechanics' lien claim. See id. at 3, \ 6, R. at 0034. 
lien claim on these statutory procedural grounds, but simply 
challenges his right to receive payment of the amounts 
claimed in the lien. 
Stipulation at 3, ^ [ 11, R. at 0159 (emphasis added). 
10. A bench trial was held on Thursday, April 15, 2004, and Friday, April 16, 
2004. At no point during the trial did Mrs. Lamb assert that Mr. Pearson failed to comply 
with any requirement of the Mechanics' Lien Act. 
11. On or about April 20, 2004, the district court entered a Memorandum 
Decision, ruling in favor of Mr. Pearson on his claims for mechanics' lien foreclosure and 
breach of contract, and stating, in relevant part, as follows: 
Plaintiff has fully complied with the lien statutes and is 
entitled to a judgment of lien foreclosure . . . . Under the lien 
statutes plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and fees, to be 
established by affidavit of counsel. 
Memorandum Decision at 12, ^ f 4, R. at 0237.4 
12. Unwilling to accept defeat, Mrs. Lamb filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
and Objection to Proposed Judgment. Through this motion, Mrs. Lamb challenged only 
The district court also concluded that "Plaintiff did not breach the contract and 
defendant is not entitled to recover on her counterclaim for breach of oral contract." 
Memorandum Decision at 12, \ 6, R. at 0237. Mrs. Lamb does not appeal this ruling. 
The remainder of Mrs. Lamb's counterclaims were voluntarily abandoned prior to trial. 
See Stipulation at 4, |^ 17, R. at 160 ("Mrs. Lamb has agreed to abandon (i) her Second 
Cause of Action against Mr. Pearson for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing, and (ii) her Third Cause of Action against Mr. Pearson for 
Negligence."). 
4
 The district court filed an Amended Memorandum Decision on or about April 23, 2004, 
to correct a clerical error. The substance of its ruling, however, did not change. 
Compare Memorandum Decision, R. at 0226-0239, with Amended Memorandum 
Decision, R. at 0240-0253. 
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the district court's liability determinations, specifically the conclusion that she was 
contractually required to compensate Mr. Pearson for the remodeling work he performed 
on the Park Meadows Property. She did not raise any question about Mr. Pearson's 
compliance with the statutory requirements of the Mechanics' Lien Act, nor did she 
challenge the district court's authority to decide that claim. See Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment, R. at 0315-0370.5 
13. Mr. Pearson filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment on or about May 25, 2004. See R. 
at 0377-0389. 
14. The next day, Mrs. Lamb filed an untimely and unauthorized Supplemental 
Motion for Reconsideration, arguing for the first time that Mr. Pearson failed to comply 
with the statutory requirements of the Mechanics' Lien Act (specifically Sections § 38-1-
ll(4)(a)), and was therefore barred and precluded from recovering his reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs. Recognizing that her prior conduct, particularly the Stipulation, 
presented a serious waiver problem, Mrs. Lamb also asserted that Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) 
was a jurisdictional provision that could not be waived. See R. at 0371-0376. 
15. Mr. Pearson filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment on or 
about June 4, 2004, arguing, in relevant part, that Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) constituted a 
mere affirmative defense, and was not a jurisdictional provision, and that Mrs. Lamb 
5
 Her motion was ultimately denied, and Mrs. Lamb does not raise any of these issues on 
appeal. 
8 
waived whatever right she might have had to rely upon Section 38-1-11(4) in challenging 
Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim. See R. at 0390-0399. 
16. On or about June 16, 2004, the district court issued a Ruling and Order 
flatly denying both of Mrs. Lamb's motions for reconsideration, and stating, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file and concludes as follows. 
The case has been tried. . . . Defendant raises new 
arguments in the guise of a motion to reconsider in her 
supplement motion. The argument advanced post-trial was 
not advanced at trial and is waived. The court rejects the 
arguments of defendant as being made in unauthorized over 
length memos, as being untimely, and on the merits for the 
reasons stated by the court in its ruling and for the reasons 
advanced by plaintiff in the opposition^ memos relating to 
these motions 
Ruling and Order at 1-2, R. at 0425-0426 (emphasis added). 
17. On or about June 28, 2004, the district court entered a Final Order and 
Judgment, stating, in relevant part, as follows: 
Mr. Pearson has fully complied with the requirements of the 
Utah Mechanics' Lien Act, U.C.A.§ 38-1-1 et aL, and holds a 
valid and enforceable mechanics' lien against Mrs. Lamb's 
real property located at 2547 Holiday Ranch Loop Road, Park 
City, Utah . . . . A judgment of lien foreclosure is therefore 
entered in favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. Lamb in the 
amount of $17,998.97, plus interest at the statutory rate of 
10% per annum from July 10, 2002, and continuing until the 
date of this judgment, plus lien filing fees of $100.00, plus 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs in the amount of 
$42,379.37. 
Final Order and Judgment at 2, % 2, R. at 0484. 
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18. Mrs. Lamb filed a Notice of Appeal on July 12, 2004,6 and an Amended 
Notice of Appeal on or about July 31, 2004. See R. at 0469-0471 & 0490-0492. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This matter was tried before the district court, at which time Mrs. Lamb had a full 
and fair opportunity to submit all evidence and make all legal arguments in support of her 
claims and defenses. After reviewing the Stipulation submitted by the parties, hearing all 
of the evidence and arguments presented at trial, and carefully considering the issues 
before it, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it determined that 
Mrs. Lamb was required to fully compensate Mr. Pearson for the remodeling work he 
performed on the Park Meadows Property, and dismissed Mrs. Lamb's counterclaim 
against Mr. Pearson. Mr. Pearson incurred substantial attorneys' fees and costs in 
preparing for, participating in and ultimately obtaining this victory at trial, fees which 
were exacerbated by Mrs. Lamb's meritless counterclaims, and her refusal to discuss 
reasonable settlement. 
Unwilling to face defeat and pay Mr. Pearson's attorneys' fees and costs, Mrs. 
Lamb filed an untimely and improper motion for reconsideration. When that motion was 
denied, she pursued this appeal. On appeal, Mrs. Lamb asserts that Mr. Pearson's claim 
for mechanics' lien foreclosure is barred and precluded based on his failure to provide her 
6
 The original notice of appeal was premature and improper because the district court had 
entered neither a final ruling on the amount of Mr. Pearson's reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs, nor a final judgment. 
10 
with notice of her alleged rights under the Residential Lien Act as required by 
Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Lien Act. This argument must be rejected. 
Mrs. Lamb affirmatively waived any right to require notice under Section 38-1-
ll(4)(a), or to invoke Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e), by (i) failing to assert it as an affirmative 
defense in her original (or amended) Answer, (ii) voluntarily stipulating and agreeing, 
before trial, that all of the requirements for foreclosure of the lien under the Mechanics' 
Lien Act had been met, and that she was not defending against the mechanics' lien on 
statutory grounds, and/or (iii) failing to assert her alleged rights either at trial or in a 
timely post-trial motion. Her attempts to avoid such waiver by trying to convert what is 
nothing more than an unpled statutory affirmative defense into a supposed jurisdictional 
defect are unavailing and unsupported by the law. Allowing Mrs. Lamb to assert these 
rights now would be futile and unjust. 
The Final Order and Judgment granting Mr. Pearson the right to foreclose on his 
mechanics' lien, and awarding him his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, should be 
affirmed. This Court should also enter an order declaring that Mr. Pearson is entitled to 
an additional award of those attorneys' fees and costs reasonably incurred on appeal, and 
remanding the matter to the district court for calculation of such an award. 
ARGUMENT 
L MRS, LAMB WAIVED ANY RIGHTS SHE MAY HAVE HAD UNDER 
SECTION 38-1-11(4), 
Mrs. Lamb asserts on appeal that Mr. Pearson's claim for mechanics' lien 
foreclosure is barred based on Mr. Pearson's alleged failure to provide Mrs. Lamb with 
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notice of her rights under the Residential Lien Act, as required by Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) 
of the Mechanics' Lien Act, and that the district court therefore had no authority to award 
Mr. Pearson his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under Section 38-1-18(1). This 
argument must be rejected because Mrs. Lamb waived whatever statutory defenses she 
may have had, and it would be a waste of judicial resources to allow her to assert them 
now.7 
Mrs. Lamb waived her defenses in at least three different ways. First, she failed to 
assert her rights under Section 38-1-11(4) as an affirmative defense to waiver in her 
original (or amended) Answer. Second, she voluntarily stipulated and agreed, before 
trial, that all of the requirements for perfecting and foreclosing of the lien under the 
Mechanics' Lien Act had in fact been met, and that she was not defending Mr. Pearson's 
foreclosure claim on statutory grounds: 
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the statutory procedural 
requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a 
7
 This case was fully tried in the district court, at which time Mrs. Lamb had a full and 
fair opportunity to present her defenses. Mr. Pearson and his attorneys expended time 
and effort preparing Mr. Pearson's case for trial, resting on the belief that he would be 
entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if he prevailed. The district 
court spent one and one-half days taking testimony and hearing argument in the case. It 
then carefully considered the evidence and arguments presented at trial and issued a 
detailed Memorandum Decision in support of its conclusion that Mr. Pearson was not 
only entitled to be compensated for the work he performed on the Park Meadows 
Property, but to also foreclose upon his mechanics' lien and recover his reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs in pursuing this action. If Mrs. Lamb truly believed that Mr. 
Pearson failed to comply with the necessary requirements of the Mechanics' Lien Act, 
she should have raised such issues in advance of trial, before such efforts were expended. 
Here failure to do so should not be rewarded on appeal. 
8
 Had Mrs. Lamb asserted such rights at that time, Mr. Pearson could have, if necessary, 
re-served his Complaint and cured any technical defect. 
1 *% 
mechanics9 lien, and the Notice of Claim of Lien filed with 
the Summit County Recorder's office on or about June 19, 
2002, meets these statutory procedural requirements; Mrs. 
Lamb does not defend against Mr. Pearson's mechanics9 
lien claim on these statutory procedural grounds^ but simply 
challenges his right to receive payment of the amounts 
claimed in the lien. 
Stipulation at 3, f 11 (emphasis added). Third, she failed to raise the defense either at 
trial or in a timely post-trial motion. Mrs. Lamb's multiple waivers, particularly that 
evidenced by the Stipulation, should be fully enforced on appeal. 
In an effort to avoid the effects of her litigation strategy, including the voluntarily 
entered Stipulation, Mrs. Lamb asserts that there was a "mutual mistake," and that 
Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) is a "jurisdictional" provision that cannot be waived. Both of these 
arguments must be rejected. 
A, There Was No Mutual Mistake. 
The parties and their counsel all believed at the time they entered the Stipulation 
that Mr. Pearson had in fact complied with all of the necessary requirements of the 
Mechanics' Lien Act, and that insofar as any debt was actually owed, Mr. Pearson was 
entitled to foreclose upon his lien. Mrs. Lamb nonetheless claims on appeal that "when 
counsel submitted the Stipulation to the court, they had overlooked 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a)'s strict requirements for perfecting the right to enforce a 
mechanic's lien and the jurisdictional issue the statute presented." Brief of Appellant at 8 
(emphasis added). This contention has no support in the record, 
Mr. Pearson and his counsel overlooked nothing when entering into the 
Stipulation, and stand firm in their belief that Mrs. Lamb had no rights to enforce under 
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the Residential Lien Act, and that providing notice under Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is futile 
and unnecessary. See supra Section II. The history of the proceedings below, and the 
course of events leading up to the Stipulation, further belie Mrs. Lamb's own self-serving 
assertions of mistake. Mrs. Lamb (through counsel) affirmatively stated at the time the 
Stipulation was made that she was not interested in litigating the technicalities of the 
Mechanics' Lien Act, and sought to challenge only Mr. Pearson's right to be paid the 
amounts claimed. It was her own attorney who suggested the Stipulation and provided 
the broad language ultimately agreed upon. Mrs. Lamb's counsel had an affirmative 
obligation to review all of the statutory provisions, and to fully analyze all of her 
potential rights thereunder, before advising her to forgo the technical challenges and enter 
the Stipulation. Mrs. Lamb, not Mr. Pearson, must bear the burden of any failure to do 
so, and cannot avoid the Stipulation now by claiming a mistake.9 
!$• Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) Creates an Affirmative Defense That Can Be (and 
Has Been) Waived. 
Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) of the Mechanics' Lien Act provides that "[i]f a lien 
claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and form affidavit 
required by Subsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or 
enforcing the lien upon the residence." This provision creates an affirmative defense to 
9
 Mrs. Lamb has competent and experienced trial counsel, and it is unlikely even a 
unilateral "mistake" was made. Counsel likely realized prior to entering the Stipulation 
that any notice under Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) was unnecessary because Mrs. Lamb had no 
actual rights to enforce. See supra Section II. After trial, faced with a disappointed and 
disgruntled client after trial, he likely searched for any theory to avoid the award of 
attorneys' fees and costs, coming up with the only possible argument he could as to why 
the lien (and, more importantly, the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs) should 
not be enforced, and the voluntarily entered Stipulation should be ignored. 
the enforcement of an otherwise valid and enforceable mechanics' lien. Such a defense, 
if not timely asserted by the residential homeowner, is waived. See Valley Bank & Trust 
Co, v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, 494 (Utah 1983) (affirmative defenses may be waived). 
There is no support for Mrs. Lamb's contention that Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) of the 
Mechanics' Lien Act is jurisdictional. Although no Utah court has ever interpreted 
Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) in a reported decision, courts from other jurisdictions have 
construed similar provisions in their respective mechanics' lien statutes, and have 
expressly rejected the jurisdictional interpretation advanced by Mrs. Lamb. 
In Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Constr. Co., 546 So. 2d 1099 (1988), for example, the 
Florida Court of Appeals interpreted a provision of Florida's mechanics' lien statute 
requiring a contractor to provide the owner of the property with an affidavit regarding the 
status of payment to subcontractors and suppliers. Although this statute could not have 
been clearer that the failure to provide the affidavit constitutes a bar to enforcement,10 the 
Florida court nonetheless held that it created a waivable affirmative defense, and was not 
The Florida statute at issue, Fla. Rev. Stat. § 713.06(3)(d)(l), states, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
When the final payment under a direct contract becomes due the contractor 
. . . shall give to the owner an affidavit stating, if that be the fact, that all 
lienors under his direct contract have been paid in full, or if the fact be 
otherwise, showing the name of each lienor who has not been paid in full 
and the amount due or to become due for each labor, services, or materials 
furnished. . . . The contractor shall have no lien or right of action against 
he owner for labor, services, or materials furnished under the direct 
contractor while in default for not giving the owner the affidavit. The 
contractor shall execute the affidavit and deliver it to the owner at least 5 
days before instituting an action as a prerequisite to the institution of any 
action to enforce his lien under this chapter.... 
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a jurisdictional provision: 
[Plaintiffs failure to provide the affidavit], however, does not 
mandate dismissal of its lawsuit or reversal of the judgment 
in its favor. Although the furnishing of the affidavit is a 
condition precedent to bringing an action to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien, failure to do so does not create a 
jurisdictional defect.. .. Thus, [defendant] was required . . . 
to plead nonperformance of the condition precedent 
'specifically and with particularity. . . .' [Defendant's] 
second affirmative defense, captioned 'Breach of Contract,' 
asserting that [plaintiff] had not fulfilled conditions of the 
contract in which the contractors' affidavit is merely 
mentioned did not satisfy the standard.... Thus, [defendant] 
has waived this argument. 
Id. at 1101 (emphasis added). See also Holding v. Elec, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 So. 2d 301, 
(Fla. 1988) (emphasis added) ("The clear purpose of [the statutory provision] is to protect 
the owner against the risk of having to pay for the same services or materials more than 
once, and to allow the owner an opportunity to make proper payment before suit is filed.. 
. . Although the statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a lien foreclosure suit, it 
is not jurisdictional."). 
In S.B. Luttrell & Co. v. Knoxvillef L. & J. R. Co., 105 S.W. 565 (1907), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court similarly concluded that a statutory provision requiring a 
subcontractor to give a railroad notice of a mechanics' lien prior to filing a suit for 
enforcement could be waived: 
The object of the notice required by the statute is to appraise 
the railroad company of the amount claimed, and thus put it 
in a position where it can protect itself against overpayment 
of the original contractor. While it performs this important 
function, yet, like any other benefit, it may be waived by the 
party in whose interest it is created. And a waiver can very 
well be assumed unless a timely objection is made to the 
notice. 
Id. at 568 (emphasis added). 
Like the mechanics' lien statutes at issue in both Hodusa and S.B. Luttrel, the 
intent and purpose of Section 38-1-11(4) is simply to give the residential homeowner 
notice of her rights under the Residential Lien Act, and provide her an opportunity to 
assert those rights as an affirmative defense to suit. It does not create a jurisdictional 
requirement, and may therefore be waived. 
None of the case law cited by Mrs. Lamb actually supports her jurisdictional 
claims. All of the cited cases involved the unique question of whether a statutory 
provision setting forth a "statutory time frame" constituted a jurisdictional requirement. 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm% 919 P.2d 547, 552-53 (Utah 1996) 
(determining whether a "statutory time frame" in the Utah Tax Code, requiring the Tax 
Commission to hear appeals within a proscribed period of time, constituted a 
jurisdictional provision); see also Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, %% 10-11, 
67 P.3d 466, 470 (determining whether Section 63-30-13 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, requiring notice of a claim against a political subdivision to be filed 
"within one year after the claim arises," constituted a jurisdictional provision); Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 (Utah 1988) (same); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth, 618 
P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah 1980) (determining whether Section 11-20-56 of the Utah Public 
Transportation District Act, requiring all claims against the Utah Transit Authority to be 
"presented to the board of directors in writing within thirty days" after the claim arises, 
constituted a jurisdictional provision). Because a statute of limitation provision, standing 
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alone, typically constitutes a mere affirmative defense, see Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), the court 
in each of the cited cases focused on whether the statutory provision also contained some 
sort of mandatory bar to enforcement. It was ultimately the coupling of a statutory time 
frame and the bar to enforcement that was critical in those cases, and the jurisdictional 
requirement was found only where such coupling occurred. Compare Patterson, 2003 
UT 7, \ 10, 67 P.3d at 470 (statutory notice requirement of Section 63-30-13 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act constituted a jurisdictional provision because it contained 
statutory limitation provision coupled with a bar to enforcement); Madsen, 769 P.2d at 
248-49 (same), with Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 553 (statutory provision in Utah Tax 
Code requiring Tax Commission to hear appeals by October 1 not jurisdictional because 
it was not coupled with bar to enforcement); Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481-82 (statutory notice 
requirement of Section 11-20-56 of the Utah Public Transportation District Act not 
jurisdictional because it did not "impose a bar for noncompliance"). Because Section 38-
1-11(4) is not a statute of limitation provision in the first instance, and because there is no 
coupling between a statutory time frame and a bar to enforcement, these cases have no 
application in this case in this appeal, and no jurisdictional requirement should be found. 
Mrs. Lamb's reliance on the term "barred" in Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) is similarly 
unavailing. Many of the recognized affirmative defenses serve as a "bar" to enforcement 
of an otherwise valid action. By way of non-exclusive example, a party is "barred" under 
the doctrine of res judicata from brining a subsequent action on a previous, fully litigated 
claim or issue. See, e.g., Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411, 
% 15, 82 P.3d 198, 202 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added) ("Generally, claim 
preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been 
folly litigated previously."); Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118, % 10, 90 P.3d 649, 
652 (A subsequent action seeking the same or approximately the same relief is "barred"" 
under the doctrine of res judicata."). Likewise, a party is equitably "barred" from 
recovery by the doctrine of laches. See, e.g., Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT 
App 306, % 28, 57 P.3d 603, 610 (emphasis added) ("Laches bars a recovery when there 
has been a delay by one party causing a disadvantage to the other party."); Nielsen-Newey 
& Co. v. Utah Resources Internal % 905 P.2d 312, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis 
added) ("We conclude that plaintiffs failure to bring its action for an accounting and 
distribution of profits against defendants for thirty-five years constitutes unreasonable 
delay, . . . We therefore hold that plaintiffs complaint is barred by laches. . . .). These 
defenses nonetheless constitute affirmative defenses subject to waiver. See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 8(c) ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . 
laches . . . , res judicata . . . , and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense."). 
II. MRS. LAMB HAS NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESIDENTIAL LIEN ACT, 
AND THUS REQUIRING NOTICE UNDER RULE 38-1 -11(4)(A) IS 
FUTILE AND UNNECESSARY. 
The notice requirement of Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics Lien Act is 
intended to provide residential homeowners with notice of those rights and defenses they 
may have under Section 38-11-107 of the Residential Lien Act. Because Mrs. Lamb 
could assert no such rights in this case, requiring such notice would be futile, and she 
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should not be able to use the alleged absence of such notice as a means of avoiding the 
award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
By its express terms, Section 38-1 l-107(l)(a) of the Residential Lien Act prevents 
an otherwise qualified party (i.e. a party otherwise authorized to file and enforce a 
mechanics' lien under the Mechanics' Lien Act) from "maintaining a [mechanics'] lien" 
against residential property, "or recovering a judgment in any civil action" against the 
owner of such residential property where "the conditions described in [S]ections 38-11-
204(4)(a) and (4)(b) are met." Sections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b) of the Residential 
Lien Act require, in relevant part, that the owner of the residential property "enter[] into a 
written contract with an original [licensed] contractor"11 for qualified construction 
services, U.C.A. § 38-11-204(3)(a)(l), and pay the original contractor "in full" under the 
terms of that written contract. Id. § 38-11-204(b). Absent these statutory preconditions, 
the residential property owner is afforded no protection under the Residential Lien Act, 
and cannot avoid the otherwise valid mechanics' lien. See id. § 38-11-107(2) ("If a 
residence is constructed under conditions that do not meet all of the provisions of 
Subsection (1) [including the requirements of Sections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b)], that 
residence and the real property associated with that residence . . . shall be subject to any 
mechanics' lien as provided in Section 38-1-3."). 
An "original contractor11 is defined under the Residential Lien Act to mean a person 
who contracts with the owner of real property . . . to provide services, labor, or material 
for the construction of the owner-occupied residence." U.C.A. § 38-11-102(16). 
on 
It is undisputed that the agreement between Mr. Pearson and Mrs. Lamb was oral, 
and that Mrs. Lamb had no written contract with Mr. Pearson. The trial court has already 
determined that Mrs. Lamb did not pay Mr. Pearson in full for his services on the Park 
Meadows Property, and did not meet her obligations under the parties' oral agreement. 
The preconditions of Sections 38-1 l-204(4)(a) and (4)(b) were not met in this case, and 
Mrs. Lamb thus has no rights to assert under the Residential Lien Act. Mrs. Lamb 
suffered no prejudice as a result of not receiving notice under Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). In 
the interest of fairness and judicial economy, she should not be allowed to now rely on 
Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) to avoid the award of reasonable attorneys5 fees and costs. 
III. MR. PEARSON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF THOSE ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS REASONABLY INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
"The general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below prevails 
on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah DepL of 
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Pearson received 
an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs below, as the "successful party" under 
Section 38-1-18(1). For the reasons set forth above, see supra Sections I & II, this Court 
should affirm that award, and should also enter an order declaring that Mr. Pearson is 
entitled to an additional award of the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred on 
appeal, and remanding the matter to the district court for calculation of such an award. 
See supra note 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Lamb had a fiill and fair opportunity to defend herself against Mr. Pearson's 
mechanics' lien foreclosure claim in the proceedings below, and had every opportunity to 
assert her alleged rights under Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) as an affirmative defense. By (i) 
failing to assert the defense in her original (or amended) Answer, (ii) voluntarily entering 
the Stipulation that Mr. Pearson complied with all requirements under the Mechanics' 
Lien Act, and expressly stating that she was not "defending] against Mr. Pearson's lien 
claim on these statutory procedural grounds, but simply challenged] his right to receive 
payment of the amounts claimed in the lien," Stipulation at 3, f 11, R. at 1059, and/or 
(iii) failing to raise the defense at trial or in a timely post-trial motion, Mrs. Lamb made 
the affirmative choice not to do so. Mrs. Lamb took a calculated risk in litigation and 
should not be heard to complain about that risk now that she has lost at trial In the 
interest of fairness and judicial economy, the district court's Final Order and Judgment, 
including the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, should be affirmed. This 
Court should also enter an order declaring that Mr. Pearson is entitled to an additional 
award of the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal, and remanding the 
matter to the district court for calculation of such an award. 
DATED this 3* day of January, 2005. 
DAVID M. BEmjWN * 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Robert Pearson dba Robert 
Pearson Construction 
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RELEVANT PORTIONS OF MECHANICS' LIEN ACT 
U.C.A.§ 38-1-1 £/re«. 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action for debt not affected -
Instructions and form affidavit and motion. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within 180 days 
from the day on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7. 
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file 
for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice 
of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or 
right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under the lien 
claimant to show actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to 
recover the same. 
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a 
residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the 
service of the complaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under 
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund 
Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit to enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds 
upon which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a) shall meet the 
requirements established by rule by the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. 
(c) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and 
form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from 
maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence. 
(d) Judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the owner of the residence under 
Title 38, Chapters 1 and 11, and Title 14, Chapter 2, shall be stayed until after the 
owner has been given a reasonable period of time to establish compliance with 
Subsections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b) through an informal proceeding, as set forth 
in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, commenced within 30 days 
of the owner being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the Division of 
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Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of compliance or 
denial of certificate of compliance, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(5) The written notice requirement applies to liens filed on or after July 1,2004. 
Amended by Chapter 188, 2004 General Session 
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38-1-18* Attorneys1 fees — Offer of judgment 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought to 
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees under Subsection (1). 
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter may make an 
offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the offer is not 
accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, 
the offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the offeror after the offer was 
made. 
Amended by Chapter 257,2001 General Session 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE RESIDENTIAL LIEN ACT 
U.C.A.§ 39-11-101 etseq. 
38-11-107. Restrictions upon maintaining a lien against residence or owner's interest in 
the residence* 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the real property 
associated with that residence under the provisions of Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, who 
provides qualified services under an agreement effective on or after January 1,1995, other than 
directly with the owner, shall be barred after January 1,1995, from maintaining a lien upon that 
residence and real property or recovering a judgment in any civil action against the owner or the 
owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for qualified services provided by that person 
if: 
(a) an owner meets the conditions described in Subsections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b); or 
(b) (i) a subsequent owner purchases a residence from an owner; 
(ii) the subsequent owner who purchased the residence under Subsection (l)(b)(i) 
occupies the residence as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days 
from the date of transfer or the residence is occupied by the subsequent owner's 
tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days from the 
date of transfer; and 
(iii) the owner from whom the subsequent owner purchased the residence met the 
conditions described in Subsections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b). 
(2) If a residence is constructed under conditions that do not meet all of the provisions of 
Subsection (1), that residence and the real property associated with that residence as defined in 
Section 38-1-4, shall be subject to any mechanics' lien as provided in Section 38-1-3. 
(3) A lien claimant who files a mechanics' lien or foreclosure action upon an owner-occupied 
residence is not liable for costs and attorneys' fees under Sections 38-1-17 and 38-1-18 or for any 
damages arising from a civil action related to the lien filing or foreclosure action if the lien 
claimant removes the lien within 15 days from the date the owner obtains a certificate of 
compliance and mails a copy of the certificate of compliance by certified mail to the lien 
claimant at the address provided for by Subsection 38-l-7(2)(e). The 15-day period begins 
accruing from the date postmarked on the certificate of compliance sent to the lien claimant. 
Amended by Chapter 42, 2004 General Session 
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38-11-204. Claims against the fund — Requirement to make a claim — Qualifications to 
receive compensation — Qualifications to receive a certificate of compliance. 
(1) To claim recovery from the fund a person shall: 
(a) meet the requirements of either Subsection (4) or (7); 
(b) pay an application fee determined by the division under Section 63-38-3.2; and 
(c) file with the division a completed application on a form provided by the division 
accompanied by supporting documents establishing: 
(i) that the person meets the requirements of either Subsection (4) or (7); 
(ii) that the person was a qualified beneficiary or laborer during the construction on 
the owner-occupied residence; and 
(iii) the basis for the claim. 
(2) To recover from the fund, the application required by Subsection (1) shall be filed no later 
than one year: 
(a) from the date the judgment required by Subsection (4)(d) is entered; 
(b) from the date the nonpaying party filed bankruptcy, if the claimant is precluded from 
obtaining a judgment or from satisfying the requirements of Subsection (4)(d) 
because the nonpaying party filed bankruptcy within one year after the entry of 
judgment; or 
(c) from the date the laborer, trying to recover from the fund, completed the laborer's 
qualified services. 
(3) To obtain a certificate of compliance an owner or agent of the owner shall establish with the 
division that the owner meets the requirements of Subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b). 
(4) To recover from the fund, regardless of whether the residence is occupied by the owner, a 
subsequent owner, or the owner or subsequent owner's tenant or lessee, a qualified beneficiary 
shall establish that: 
(a) (i) the owner of the owner-occupied residence or the owner's agent entered into a 
written contract with an original contractor licensed or exempt from licensure 
under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act: 
(A) for the performance of qualified services; 
(B) to obtain the performance of qualified services by others; or 
(C) for the supervision of the performance by others of qualified services in 
construction on that residence; 
(ii) the owner of the owner-occupied residence or the owner's agent entered into a 
written contract with a real estate developer for the purchase of an owner-
occupied residence; or 
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(iii) the owner of the owner-occupied residence or the owner's agent entered into a 
written contract with a factory built housing retailer for the purchase of an owner-
occupied residence; 
(b) the owner has paid in full the original contractor, licensed or exempt from licensure 
under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, real estate 
developer, or factory built housing retailer under Subsection (4)(a) with whom the 
owner has a written contract in accordance with the written contract and any 
amendments to the contract; 
(c) (i) the original contractor, licensed or exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 
55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, the real estate developer, or the 
factory built housing retailer subsequently failed to pay a qualified beneficiary 
who is entitled to payment under an agreement with that original contractor or 
real estate developer licensed or exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 
55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, for services performed or materials 
supplied by the qualified beneficiary; 
(ii) a subcontractor who contracts with the original contractor, licensed or exempt 
from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing 
Act, the real estate developer, or the factory built housing retailer failed to pay a 
qualified beneficiary who is entitled to payment under an agreement with that 
subcontractor or supplier; or 
(iii) a subcontractor who contracts with a subcontractor or supplier failed to pay a 
qualified beneficiary who is entitled to payment under an agreement with that 
subcontractor or supplier; 
(d) (i) the qualified beneficiary filed: 
(A) an action against the nonpaying party to recover monies owed to the qualified 
beneficiary within 180 days from the date the qualified beneficiary last 
provided qualified services, unless precluded from doing so by the nonpaying 
party's bankruptcy filing within the 180 days after completion of services; and 
(B) a notice of commencement of action with the division within 30 days from the 
date the qualified beneficiary filed the civil action if a civil action was filed as 
required by Subsection (4)(d)(i)(A); 
(ii) the qualified beneficiary has obtained a judgment against the nonpaying party 
who failed to pay the qualified beneficiary under an agreement to provide 
qualified services for construction of that owner-occupied residence; 
(iii) (A) the qualified beneficiary has: 
(I) obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction the issuance of an 
order requiring the judgment debtor, or if a corporation any officer of 
the corporation, to appear before the court at a specified time and place 
to answer concerning the debtor's or corporation's property; 
(II) received return of service of the order from a person qualified to serve 
documents under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b); and 
(Ill) made reasonable efforts to obtain asset information from the 
supplemental proceedings; and 
(B) if assets subject to execution are discovered as a result of the order required 
under Subsection (4)(d)(iii)(A) or for any other reason, to obtain the 
issuance of a writ of execution from a court of competent jurisdiction; or 
(iv) the qualified beneficiary timely filed a proof of claim where permitted in the 
bankruptcy action, if the nonpaying party has filed bankruptcy; 
(e) the qualified beneficiary is not entitled to reimbursement from any other person; and 
(f) the qualified beneficiary provided qualified services to a contractor, licensed or 
exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act. 
(5) The requirements of Subsections (4)(d)(i), (ii), and (iii) need not be met if the qualified 
beneficiary has been precluded from obtaining a judgment against the nonpaying party or from 
satisfying the requirements of Subsections (4)(d)(i), (ii), and (iii) because the nonpaying party 
filed bankruptcy. 
(6) If a qualified beneficiary fails to file the notice with the division required under Subsection 
(4)(d)(i)(B), the claim of the qualified beneficiary shall be paid: 
(a) if otherwise qualified under this chapter; 
(b) to the extent that the limit of Subsection 38-ll-203(4)(a) has not been reached by 
payments from the fund to qualified beneficiaries who have complied with the notice 
requirements of Subsection (4)(d)(i)(B); and 
(c) in the order that the claims are filed by persons who fail to comply with Subsection 
(4)(d)(i)(B), not to exceed the limit of Subsection 38-ll-203(4)(a). 
(7) To recover from the fund a laborer shall: 
(a) establish that the laborer has not been paid wages due for the work performed at the 
site of a construction on an owner-occupied residence; and 
(b) provide any supporting documents or information required by rule by the division. 
(8) A fee determined by the division under Section 63-38-3.2 shall be deducted from any 
recovery from the fund received by a laborer. 
(9) The requirements of Subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b) may be satisfied if an owner or agent of the 
owner establishes to the satisfaction of the director that the owner of the owner-occupied 
residence or the owner's agent entered into a written contract with an original contractor who: 
(a) was a business entity that was not licensed under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, but was solely or partly owned by an individual 
who was licensed under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing 
Act; or 
(b) was a natural person who was not licensed under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, but who was the sole or partial owner and 
qualifier of a business entity that was licensed under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act. 
(10) The director shall have equitable power to determine if the requirements of Subsections 
(4)(a) and (4)(b) have been met, but any decision by the director under Title 38, Chapter 11, shall 
not alter or have any effect on any other decision by the division under Title 58. 
Amended by Chapter 42, 2004 General Session 
££»£ *-> i 
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DAVID M.BENNION (5664) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Robert Pearson 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
OCT 2 k 2002 
Intra utsuict uourt 
Thirty Clerk, 8 u ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT PEARSON 
ZONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
1UZANNEJ.LAMB, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. D<QDS D£>(*2>L> LM 
Judge &HuJL<L C< LlA.h>eL£_& 
Plaintiff Robert Pearson dba Robert Pearson Construction ("Pearson"), by and through 
is above-named counsel of record, for his claims for relief against Defendant Suzanne J. Lamb 
Lamb") alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Pearson is a resident of Summit County, Utah. 
2. Defendant Lamb is a resident of the State of California, and is the record owner of 
5 Subject Property of this action. 
737.1 
JURISDICTION & VENUE 
3. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
4. Venue properly lies in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1, because 
this action seeks to foreclose on a mechanic's lien against real property that is situated in Summit 
County. 
SUBJECT PROPERTY 
5. The property at issue in this action is a certain parcel of residential property 
located at 2547 Holladay Ranch Loop Road, Park City, Summit County, Utah, and more 
particularly described as: Parcel #PKM-82, All of Lot 82, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISION 
#1 SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof as filed in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, Coalville, Utah (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. Defendant Lamb and her deceased husband, Richard C. Lamb contracted with 
Pearson, to provide services, materials and/or equipment to the Property for construction of 
improvements thereon. 
7. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Pearson furnished services, materials 
and/or equipment to the Property between approximately December 1, 2001 and May 31,2002. 
8. Pearson has not been paid for his contribution to the Property as described above. 
CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure) 
9. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 above, 
as if set forth in full herein. 
10. Because Pearson has not been paid for the services he performed and materials 
and equipment he furnished to the Property, he prepared and filed a lien against the Property in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Mechanic's 
Lien is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated herein by reference. 
11. Pearson caused a copy of his Notice of Mechanic's Lien to be mailed to Lamb as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(4)(a). 
12. Pearson is entitled to a mechanic's lien in an amount equal to the reasonable value 
)f the services performed and equipment and materials furnished to the Property as indicated on 
lis lien, plus prejudgment interest. 
13. On information and belief, Pearson's lien is equal or superior to the rights, titles, 
laims and interests of others holding an interest in the Property. 
14. On information and belief, Lamb owns the fee simple interest in the Property. 
15. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15, Pearson is entitled to have his Mechanic's 
ien foreclosed, to have the Property sold, and the proceeds of said sale applied to satisfy the 
ligation Pearson. 
16. In the event the proceeds from the sale are not sufficient to satisfy those 
ligations, Pearson is further entitled to a deficiency judgment against Lamb in accordance with 
ah Code Ann. §38-146. 
17. Lamb has incurred attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, and lien fees and costs for the 
^paration and recordation of the Notice of Lien and the prosecution of this claim, in an amount 
be established at trial, all of which attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, and lien fees and costs 
>uld be granted to Pearson pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and 18. 
37.1 3 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract) 
18. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 17 above, 
as if set forth in full herein. 
19. Pearson contracted with Lamb and her deceased husband, Richard C. Lamb, to 
provide services, materials and/or equipment to the Property for construction of improvements 
thereon. 
20. Under the terms of the contract, Pearson agreed to make the improvements 
designated by the Lambs, and the Lambs agreed to pay Pearson for the cost of such services, 
materials and/or equipment, plus ten percent (10%). 
21. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Pearson furnished services, materials 
and/or equipment to the Property in a satisfactory and workmanlike manner and completed all 
the work that he had agreed to perform. 
22. Despite repeated demands, Lamb has not paid Pearson for his work under the 
contract, thereby damaging Pearson. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Pearson prays for judgment against Lamb as follows: 
a. On his First Claim for Relief, for an order and judgment against Lamb 
establishing the amounts due to Pearson pursuant to the Lien, that the Lien is a valid lien against 
the Property and improvements thereon, the priority of the Lien as senior and prior or equal to 
any other interest in the Property, ordering foreclosure against the Property and that the Property 
be sold, and that Pearson be paid the amounts due and owing from the proceeds of the sale plus 
interest at the statutory rate from the day payment was due until paid, attorney's fees and costs 
4Q17V71 d 
incurred in pursing this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 and -18, and in the event 
proceeds from the sale are not sufficient to satisfy those obligations, for a deficiency judgment 
against Lamb in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-16; 
b. On his second claim for relief, for damages for Lamb's breach of contract in the 
amount of $18,998.97, plus pre- and post-judgment interest at the legal rate and costs of suit 
incurred herein; 
c. For such other and further relief as is appropriate under the circumstances. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of October, 2002. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
1AVID M. BENNION 
Attorneys for Robert Pearson 
laintiff s Address: 
obert Pearson Construction 
.O. Box 526001 
alt Lake City, Utah 84152-6001 
37.1 S 
EXHIBIT A 
'.obert Pearson Construction 
lobert Pearson 
.O. Box 526001 
alt Lake City, Utah 84152 
501)514-4668 
NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN 
"Mechanic's Lien/Preliminary claim against Bond" 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN C. N. S., L.L;C:i ^ undensigned acting 
s the duly authorized limited agent o f . R O B E R T - P E A 8 S C H 4 ; C K ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m a n r . 
aid agent hereby gives notice of the intention of said^claimai^l^i^^g^j^^^pichanic's 
in and right of claim against any required construeTHo^^ 
te provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et. seq., a n d f l ^ ^ ^ f c ^ ^ ^ J 
Tierided. That said lien is against the property and i rh^ i l l iS^^ 
J
~"" |§d by RICHARD C. LAMB and SUZANNE J. L A M I ^ S I 
accordance with 
^alDes^ipWiif?^-- ''^immm* 
I of Lot 82, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISjCii iJ 
sreof as filed in the office of the Summit QMlrJtol i^^riS 
The lien claimant was employed by and did p r o f i i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
d labor for the benefit and improvement of said real ptjjj$00^ 
IZANNE4-- LAMB. That first said services, labor and materiil^ 
01 and last provided on May 31, 2002. That there is d u e - « ^ i f f i n S H L 
Eighteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight dollars and Nihe|p§||| | j | |§ 
lether with interest, costs of $150.00 and attorney fees, if a p p j i S ^ ^ ^ ^ 
imant holds and claims this lien. '-yl^e 
INTERMOUNTAIN G.N.&7, LkC* 
Limited ad£ntfor the li^claimant 
ATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. BY: 
UNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
"Am 
AnthonYC. ScarbordugriT 
On JuneJjB.,2002. persioqa^pjieaiedJie^^ 
% S., L L C , the Company that executed the above and foregoing instalment as limited agent for the-fiC""* 
j||aUaid instrument was signed in behalf of said Company and that said Anthony L. Scarborough ackrl? 
| | | t j i£pid Company executed the same. IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixed myjf| 
-: > My Commission Expires; 
August 9,2005 
NotaiyPublic "™TI 
KELLY CASSELL I 
«14 South 600 EW, #21 ' 
&Atj*»C«y,UtahB4105 I 
My Commlsston Expire* . 
Augu*9.2005 I 
Bp^S»teofUlah i 
Salt 
/ \JSMUK 
IbtaW Public, residing in 
M.al . ke City, UT * & * 
0062242Jgp£| 
ALAH SPRI6Gs|il_ 
2002 m$m&& 
R£QUEST*M§J|$lf 
WHEN RECORDED RETURK 
Robert Pearson Construction 
Robert Pearson 
P.O. Box 526001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
(801)514-4668 
NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN 
"Mechanic's Lien/Preliminary claim against Bond" 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN C. N. S., L.L;C.,?t|e undersigned acting 
as the duly authorized limited agent of .ROBERT -PEARSON C O j | i j | | J | ^ ^ i p j i a i m a n r . 
Said agent hereby gives notice of the intention of sakidaimanl l^ly^ 5^*^^*^^^" 
lien and right of claim against any required;ooi[^gi^g^bp^^^ 
the provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et. s e q . , w a r i i ^ i ^ " * " 
amended. That said lien is against the property arxJ irhprovem||ts 
~~~ >ed by RICHARD C. LAMB and SUZANNE J / u M j f l 
sfe^liBprith; 
HHi 
"fit 
Legal Desc^pBb^ 
All of Lot 82, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISjGpfg 
thereof as filed in the office of the Summit Coii^lf 
The lien claimant was employed by and did prciyid^5^" 
and labor for the benefit and improvement of said real pt0&i^ 
SUZANNE^.. LAMB. That first said services, labor and materia^ 
2001 and last provided on May 31, 2002. That there is due J i f | 
of Eighteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight dollars and Nihe^^ 
together with interest, costs of $150.00 and attorney fees, if a p p | W ^ ^ ^ | ^ 
claimant holds and claims this lien. 
INTERMOUNTAINC:N.% ^ ( - 1 
Limited ad&ntfor the Jte^laimant 
STATE OF UTAH ) / / / / - ^T / /f 
:ss. BY: /JmtTtV^^^%y^^ 
Scarborough COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On JtinC!&,2002, persopafc^ ii |g^N. S., LL.C, the Company that executed the above and 
'":f-;-i&>?hj&< 
• ".-li^ife^-. 
^£4S-S?ii 
£/-.*? **££ 
&'3??Iifi3sr5§5S 
?KN?*ltil5§i 
^^ s 
' • ^ ' ^ 
£$& 
Sgadxutttugh*.^ 
instrument as limited agent for th^f ^ 
said instrument was signed in behalf of said Company and that said Anthony L Scarborough ackni|| 
| | i ^ $ ^ ^ y ^ e x e c u t e d the same. IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixedffl| 
WyCommission Expires: 
Xugust 9,2005 
(AA4JIAA, 
NotaiyPubSc 
KELLY CASSELL 
1314 South 600 East, «21 
Salt Late Of t Utah B4105 
MyConwntestonExph©* 
Augwt 0.2005 
State of Utah 
1 
I 
I 
I 
J 
Public, residing in 
Lake City, UT 
0 0 6 2 2 4 2 S I 
ALAN SPRISGSiL 
2002 JUN 19 i ia 
REQUEST*!*! 
Tab 3 
wayne A. Vance (7109) 
[ILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
O. Box 682800 
>00 N. Park Avenue, Suite D200 
irk City, Utah 84068-2800 
Telephone: (435) 649-8209 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8428 
'torneyfor Suzanne J. Lamb 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DBERT PEARSON dba ; 
3BERT PEARSON CONSTRUCTION, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JZANNE J. LAMB, ] 
Defendant. ) 
1 ANSWER 
> Case No. 020500636 LM 
i Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Defendant, SUZANNE J. LAMB, by and through her attorney of record, hereby responds 
the Complaint filed herein on behalf of Plaintiff, ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT 
iARSON CONSTRUCTION, as follows: 
1. In response to Paragraphs 1,10 and 11 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant is without 
Eficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained 
jrein and therefore denies the same. 
1 
2. In response to Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 14 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant admits 
the allegations contained therein. 
3. In response to Paragraphs 8, 12r 13, 15,16, 20 and 21 of Plaintiff s Complaint, 
Defendant denies the allegations contained therein. 
4. In response to Paragraphs 6 and 19 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant admits that she 
and her deceased husband contracted with Plaintiff to make some improvements to the subject 
property within a limited scope and budget, and deny the remainder of the allegations contained 
therein. 
5. In response to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant admits that Plaintiff 
made some improvements to the subject property, denies the remainder of the allegations 
contained therein, and specifically alleges that Plaintiff made numerous improvements to the 
subject property in excess of the scope of work agreed upon by Defendant and her deceased 
husband, further that Plaintiff has charged in excess of the budget agreed upon by Defendant and 
her deceased husband. 
6. In response to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant admits that "Lamb has 
incurred attorneys' fees, costs, expenses", denies the remainder of the allegations contained 
therein, and specifically alleges that Defendant should be awarded the attorney's fees, costs and 
expenses she has incurred herein in an amount to be established at trial. 
7. In response to Paragraph 22 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant admits that she has not 
paid Plaintiff the full amount he has demanded, denies the remainder of the allegations contained 
therein, and specifically alleges that Plaintiff is not entitled to the amount he has demanded. 
2 
8. In response to Paragraphs 9 and 18 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant hereby 
icorporates by reference all of her responses to the allegations incorporated by reference into 
aid paragraphs. 
9. Defendant denies each and every allegation not specifically admitted herein. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant upon which relief may be 
ranted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of 
;toppel, waiver, laches, payment, and/or unclean hands. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred due to failure to mitigate damages. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs damages, if any, were caused as a result of Plaintiff s own actions. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff breached its fiduciary duty owed to Defendants regarding the costs incurred with 
jpect to the construction of the subject residence, and is therefore liable to Defendants for the 
reasonable cost overruns. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
There was not a sufficient meeting of the minds between Plaintiff and Defendant to 
istitute a valid contract. 
3 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is not properly licensed to perform the work for which he seeks compensation in 
his Complaint, and therefore the claims made in Plaintiffs Complaint are absolutely barred by 
the provisions of Section 58-55-604 of the Utah Code. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant prays that this 
Court enter judgment as follows: 
1. Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with prejudice; 
2. That Plaintiff take nothing by its Complaint; 
3. For Defendant's costs in defending Plaintiffs Complaint incurred herein, 
including reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper, equitable, and just. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2002. 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of December, 2002,1 mailed, via first class mail, 
rostage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: 
David M. Bennion 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
W.MY1 jbwifru 
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Tab 4 
DAVID M. BENNION (5664) 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE (8870) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
3ne Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
^ s t Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
facsimile: (801)536-6111 
Attorneys for Robert Pearson 
)AVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
4ILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
'.O. Box 682800 
20 North Park Avenue 
uilding D, Suite 200 
ark City, Utah 84098 
elephone: (435) 649-8209 
acsimile: (435)649-8428 
ttorneys for Suzanne Lamb 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT PEARSON 
DNSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
JZANNEJ.LAMB, 
Defendant. 
rZANNEJ.LAMB, 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
•BERT PEARSON dba ROBERT PEARSON 
NSTRUCTION 
STIPULATIONS OF FACT AND 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXHIBITS 
Case No. 020500636 LM 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
STIPULATIONS OF FACT 
The parties, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree to the 
following issues of fact: 
1. Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Robert Pearson ("Mr. Pearson") is an 
individual residing in Summit County, Utah. Mr. Pearson is a general contractor doing business 
as Robert Pearson Construction, holding an active contractor's license (#263930-5501) with the 
State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Suzanne J. Lamb ("Mrs. Lamb") is a resident of California, owning a 
parcel of residential rental property located in Summit County, Utah, at 2547 Holiday Ranch 
Loop Road, Park City (the "Park Meadows Property"), and more particularly described as 
follows: 
Parcel #PKM-82 
All of Lot 82, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISION #1 
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof as filed in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah. 
3- Mrs. Lamb's husband, Richard Lamb ("Mr. Lamb"), became seriously ill in 
January 2001 and passed away on July 15, 2002.l 
4. Prior to the Fall of 2001, Mr. Pearson had a prior business relationship with the 
Lambs: 
a. Mr. Pearson constructed a vacation home for the Lambs in Summit 
County, Utah, located at 1960 Three Kings Drive, Park City, Utah ('Three Kings Property"), and 
has since worked on a wine cellar and performed other work at the Three Kings Property. 
Mr. and Mrs. Lamb are collectively referred to herein as the "Lambs; 
b. Mr. Pearson also constructed a home in Summit County for the Lambs' 
laughter. 
5. In the summer/fall of 2001, Mr. Pearson and the Lambs entered into an oral 
ontract pursuant to which Mr. Pearson was hired to perform certain remodeling work at the Park 
/teadows Property.2 
6. Mr. Pearson received the following payments from the Lambs for the work he 
erformed at the Park Meadows Property: 
a. Check number 2270, dated August 24, 2001, in the amount of $3,000.00, 
ayable to Mr. Pearson and signed by Mr. Lamb, as a deposit on the "new roof" at the Park 
[eadows Property; 
b. Check number 2288, in the amount of $5,855.00, payable to Mr. Pearson 
d signed by Mr. Lamb, as a "final payment" on the "roof & painting" at the Park Meadows 
operty. Although this check was erroneously dated October 16, 2002, it was actually written 
Mr. Lamb on October 16, 2001; 
c. Check number 2289, dated October 16, 2001, in the amount of $3,500.00, 
/able to Mr. Pearson and signed by Mr. Lamb, as a "progress pay't" for "doors, windows & 
ming" at the Park Meadows Property; and 3>&T~ 
d. Check number 2347, dated February 6, 2002, payable to Mr. Pearson and 
A 
led by Mrs. Lamb, for "repairs" at the Park Meadows Property. 
7. The Lambs also received a $900.00 credit against the work Mr. Pearson 
brmed on the Park Meadows Property from the sale of extra wood siding to a third party. 
hough the parties stipulate to the existence of a contractual relationship between them, Mr. Pearson contends 
there were in fact two separate contracts for the work he performed at the Park Meadows Property, while Mrs. 
b contends there was only one. The parties further dispute the terms and conditions of said contract(s) with 
ct to, among other things, cost, scope of work and time for completion. 
8. Other than the amounts set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7, Mr. Pearson has not 
received any additional compensation from the Lambs for the work he performed at the Park 
Meadows Property. 
9. In February 2002 a pipe froze and broke at the Park Meadows Property, causing 
substantial flooding and damage to the interior of the home. The Lambs submitted a claim to the 
insurer of the home, and received a check from the insurance company in the amount of 
$6,351.21 to repair the damage. 
10. Mr. Pearson offered to repair the damage caused by the frozen and busted pipe in 
February 2002 and the Lambs agreed to let him do that work. Mr. Pearson first billed the Lambs 
for this work in the invoice dated "December 1, 2001 thru May 1, 2002." This invoice included 
charges for that repair work and other work, and was provided to Mrs. Lamb on or about May 
29,2002. The Lambs have not made any payments to Mr. Pearson since February 6,2002. 
11. Mr. Pearson has complied with all the statutory procedural requirements for 
perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics* lien, and the Notice of Claim of Lien filed with the 
Summit County Recorder's office on or about June 19, 2002, meets these statutory procedural 
requirements; Mrs. Lamb does not defend against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim on these 
statutory procedural grounds, but simply challenges his right to receive payment of the amounts 
claimed in the lien. 
12. Mr. Pearson expended $100.00 to have the Notice of Mechanics' Lien prepared, 
filed and served. 
13. The Park Meadows Property was listed for sale from February 2002 until August 
2002, pursuant to a listing agreement with Prudential Utah Real Estate. 
14. The Park Meadows Property was vacant and not rented from May 1, 2001, thru 
Jeptember 30, 2002. 
15. From January 1, 2000 thru April 30, 2001, the Park Meadows Property rented for 
1,600 per month. 
16. Beginning October 1, 2002, the Park Meadows Property rented for $1,800 per 
lonth. 
17. Mrs. Lamb has agreed to abandon (i) her Second Cause of Action against Mr. 
earson for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and (ii) her Third 
ause of Action against Mr. Pearson for Negligence. 
STIPULATION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXHIBITS 
The parties have agreed to pre-mark all exhibits (Joint Exhibits, Plaintiffs Exhibits, and 
efendant's Exhibits) for use and identification at trial, and to provide those documents to the 
3urt in a single binder, with appropriate tabs, no later than 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 14, 
(04. The parties hereby stipulate and agree that all such exhibits are admissible for purposes of 
al, but reserve the right to make arguments regarding weight and interpretation. 
DATED this \d day of April, 2004. ^ 
~~~ .. .7? 
DAVID M. BENNIOy/ * ' 'S " 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Robert Pearso; Attorneys forKooei 
DAVID B.THOMPSON 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Suzanne Lamb 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT 
PEARSON CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUZANNE J. LAMB, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 020500636 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: April 20, 2004 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
pril 15 and 16, 2004. Plaintiff was present with David B. 
hompson and Defendant was present with Michael P. Petrogeorge. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint October 24, 2002, seeking 
echanic's lien foreclosure and damages for breach of contract, 
e alleged defendant owns the property at 2547 Holladay Ranch 
oop Road, Park City, Summit County, which is Lot 82 of the Park 
eadows Subdivision #1. (Park Meadows). Plaintiff alleged 
efendant and her deceased husband Richard Lamb contracted with 
laintiff to provide service and material for remodeling 
Dnstruction on the property between December 1, 2001, and May 
1, 2002, plaintiff did the work and defendant has not paid. 
Laintiff filed a lien June 19, 2002, and mailed a copy to 
efendant. Plaintiff asks that the lien be foreclosed, the 
coperty sold, and the proceeds satisfy the obligation, and 
Laintiff seeks fees and costs under the mechanic's lien 
:atutes. Plaintiff alleges that despite several demands, 
efendant has not paid. Plaintiff seeks damages of $18,998.97 for 
reach of contract. 
Defendant filed an answer December 27, 2002, denying the 
.legations and asserting plaintiff was not licensed, and that he 
.d work above and beyond the agreement and that defendant has 
lid all that is owed. On February 19, 2003, defendant filed an 
tended answer and counterclaim. In the counterclaim defendant 
leged she and her late husband and plaintiff entered an oral 
•ntract for plaintiff to improve the property by performing such 
sks as painting, improving the kitchen and baths, repairing 
replaces, installing doors, and such miscellaneous work in an 
isting home. Defendant alleges the agreement was that the cost 
uld not exceed $20,000, and that the improvements were to be 
done by December 1, 2001. Defendant claims plaintiff made 
unauthorized and unnecessary improvements and that the work was 
not done until the Spring of 2002. She counterclaims for breach 
of oral contract and seeks damages for lost rentals and the cost 
of returning the property to a proper condition for sale or 
rental, for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and for negligence in his duty to defendant, and seeks 
damages to be determined at trial. 
Plaintiff filed a reply to the counterclaim on April 15, 
2003, and denied the allegations of the counterclaim and asserted 
affirmative defenses. 
The case was set for trial. 
The court heard evidence, the stipulation of the parties, 
received exhibits, heard argument of counsel, and is fully 
advised. 
INTRODUCTION 
The case presents a classic example of the problems that 
arise when knowledgeable parties engage in such construction 
activities without any written contracts. Samuel Goldwyn's famous 
quip about x>an oral contract is not worth the paper it is written 
on/' while light hearted and nonsensical, applies here. The case 
presents a difficult decision for the court. The court does not 
decide this case purely on credibility as the parties suggest the 
court must. The court finds both parties to be decent, good 
people who see things from their differing perspective. Sitting 
in the chairs of the parties each no doubt sees the case as 
clear-plaintiff thinks it was his way, defendant thinks it is her 
way. The court believes both parties in almost all regards. 
Plaintiff in summary asserts that there was an understanding, 
based on past conduct, that the work would be done on a time plus 
materials plus 10% profit basis. Defendant claims she told 
plaintiff that there was a $20,000 budget and he knew that and 
she thought all work he was doing was within that budget. Both 
positions make sense and have evidence to back them up. It is 
clear that the Lambs rejected previous formal bids in the range 
of $100,000 to $200,000 for a total renovation. Thus, plaintiff 
could not reasonably be justified in thinking there was no budget 
at all, no limit to what he could do. On the other hand, it does 
not seem reasonable that Ms. Lamb, an experienced property owner, 
could believe plaintiff could do the work discussed for under 
$20,000. It does not seem reasonable for an owner and contractor 
to believe that there would be no time limit on the work, and it 
does seem reasonable that a time deadline would be in place for 
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the upcoming Olympics in February 2002. However; it does not seem 
reasonable that the work discussed could be done in two or three 
months, especially given the course of events as they unfolded. 
It does not seem reasonable that plaintiff, who had a 
relationship with the Lambs who at the time owned in essence six 
rental properties in Summit County, would undertake to do work 
that was not even discussed or authorized as Ms. Lamb claims 
plaintiff did. Those factors make this a difficult case to 
decide. 
The court is ruling in favor of plaintiff as will be 
discussed more fully below. The reason is not simply because it 
believes plaintiff and does not believe Ms. Lamb. It is because 
of the course of conduct and the manner in which this "moving 
target7' changed and evolved. Here plaintiff basically had an 
arrangement with Richard Lamb, now deceased, whereby plaintiff 
mderstood they had a certain relationship and ongoing "deal" to 
io work on a time and materials plus 10% cost (profit) basis. 
Defendant Suzanne Lamb did not have that understanding. She 
operates from the position that she told plaintiff a budget of 
?20,000 existed and that was firm and understood. While it may 
lave been understood at a given point in time early in this 
process, that changed, both with Mr. Lamb and Ms. Lamb and 
plaintiff. Plaintiff operates from the position that Richard Lamb 
.n essence modified that budget and eliminated it. Both parties 
ire genuine and believable, but arrive at the courthouse with 
iiffering perspectives and understandings. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The parties stipulate to various facts that are incorporated 
nto these findings. 
1. Plaintiff is a general contractor with an active 
ontractor's license and has been for approximately 15 years. 
2. Defendant lives in Woodland Hills, California, and has 
or 40 years, and owns substantial property in Summit County. 
he and her husband, Richard Lamb, who passed away July 15, 2002, 
ought the property at issue here, a parcel of rental property in 
ummit County, PKM-82, Lot 82, Park Meadows Subdivision #1, in 
981. (Park Meadows). It had always been a rental property. The 
ambs recently owned five properties in Summit County, including 
second home in which they rent an apartment over the garage, 
•zo condominiums they rent, and they owned but recently sold a 
3 
X7 ^ 
third condo they rented. In addition, their daughter owns and 
rents a home next to defendant's second home. Defendant and her 
husband had a prior business relationship with plaintiff. 
Plaintiff built their second home on Three Kings Drive (Three 
Kings) as well as the home of defendant's daughter, which adjoins 
the Lambs' second home on Three Kings. Plaintiff has done 
repairs and such to those homes. In those past projects, Richard 
Lamb was the "money man" who handled payment and cost 
discussions, while defendant was the "design person" who 
discussed changes and picked out fixtures, colors, flooring, and 
such. That relationship amongst plaintiff and the Lambs is in 
large part what causes the court to arrive at the result it has. 
In this dispute, some of the discussions were with Richard Lamb 
and some with defendant. None of the agreements were reduced to 
writing concerning this property. 
3. Plaintiff had constructed a vacation, or second, home for 
the Lambs on Three Kings Drive in 1998-1999, as well as a home 
for their daughter next door. That second home for the Lambs was 
built at a cost of approximately $650,000. In 2001 the parties 
entered into what they call "an oral contract" and plaintiff was 
hired by the Lambs to do certain remodeling work at the Park 
Meadow rental property. The court is not as certain that this was 
a contract as are the parties by their stipulation. 
4. The Lambs were interested in upgrading, for possible sale 
or for continued rental, the Park Meadows property. The Park 
Meadows home had been rented since the Lambs bought it, 
presumably with some periods of vacancy, though there was no 
evidence historically as to its occupancy rate. The Lambs asked 
plaintiff to do some drawings. Plaintiff in July, 2001, gave two 
bids to the Lambs, one for approximately $100,000 and one for 
approximately $200,000, and those included drawings. The Lambs 
rejected both bids as being too expensive as they wanted more 
"cosmetic" repairs though at one time they were interested in 
building a bedroom and bath above the existing structure. In 
May, 2001, defendant and her daughter Alice and plaintiff met at 
the property and Ms. Lamb told him she wanted various work done 
and that there would be a budget of $20,000 for the work, that is 
all she wanted to spend. Richard Lamb was not present at that 
meeting. Ms. Lamb indicated various work she wanted done. That 
included a new roof, painting the exterior and interior of the 
home, redoing the fireplace, changing the master bedroom and 
closet, fixing the main bath shower and toilet, adding doors on a 
laundry room, replacing the range and microwave in the kitchen, 
replace some steps outside a sliding door, and replacing the 
outside windows and doors. Based on that plaintiff prepared the 
drawings and proposals, which were more extensive than Ms. Lamb 
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had desired. Those drawings seemed to incorporate everything they 
parties had discussed, including an upstairs addition. Those 
possibilities were rejected. 
5. In August, 2001, the Lambs and plaintiff met at the Park 
Meadows property and had further discussions. They also met at 
Three Kings. On August 24, 2001, both parties merely "assumed" 
things and there was not a detailed discussion about cost and 
price. The Lambs, principally Ms. Lamb, again discussed various 
work they wanted done. She mentioned again there was a budget of 
$20,000. At that point there was no final discussion as to 
exactly what work was to be done, as there was discussion about 
various projects and possible improvements that would make the 
Droperty either more saleable or more rentable. The property was 
lot in good shape at that time. The property had been rented up 
to the end of April 2001 for approximately $1600 per month, and 
It was vacant after May 1, 2001, until October, 2002. The time 
frame was discussed and it was anticipated the work could be done 
Ln about three months. 
6. At the same time, in August, 2001, Plaintiff said he 
:ould do the roof for approximately $6000 and Richard Lamb gave 
)laintiff a check for $3000 on August 24, 2001, as a deposit on 
,hat work. Plaintiff obtained a building permit August 28, 
'001, to do the roofing. Plaintiff considered, based on the past 
lealings, that such was an estimate and it was really a time and 
laterials plus 10% profit. In fact the roof cost $5655 and that 
s what he billed to the Lambs. Plaintiff did not charge $6000 
ut charged time and materials and profit for that work though it 
as not written up that way on the invoice. Richard Lamb also 
ave plaintiff a check that date in the sum of $3099 for the 
emodel work plaintiff had done at Three Kings. That exchange 
f that check took place at Three Kings, and the parties 
hen went to Park Meadows where the discussions about Park 
eadows occurred, as well as the exchange of the $3000 deposit, 
laintiff commenced the roof work and in doing that, talked with 
ichard Lamb about the need for exterior paint and how it would 
e more effective to do that while the roof was being repaired, 
ichard Lamb approved that painting and plaintiff said he could 
:> it for a flat rate of $3200. Plaintiff applied a coat of 
rimer and a finish coat. That work, the roofing and exterior 
minting, was done approximately mid-September, 2001. Plaintiff 
3nt an invoice to the Lambs on September 17, 2001. That was for 
total of $8855, the $5655 for the roof and $3200 for the 
iinting, Richard Lamb paid the balance by check, $5855, which 
is the total cost of $8855 minus the $3000 deposit, on October 
5, 2001. That was noted as "final payment" on the "roof and 
linting" at Park Meadows on the check. Both parties argued 
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about whether there was one or two contracts. To the court it is 
not important. If there was one contract as defendant asserts, 
her position becomes more untenable because adding the cost of 
roofing and painting makes her belief that such work could all be 
done for under $20,000 more unreasonable. 
7. During that Fall, in September, October, and November, 
plaintiff had discussions, via telephone, with Richard Lamb and * 
with Ms. Lamb about various work, including the installation of 
doors and windows. This is where the confusion comes into play 
and where the parties disagree and where the case turns largely. 
The court finds that plaintiff and Richard Lamb in essence 
modified the previous discussions about a budget. Based on the 
course of conduct in the past and the discussions between Richard 
Lamb and plaintiff, and to some extent Ms. Lamb, there was a new 
agreement whereby plaintiff was to put the Park Meadow property 
in better condition* There was not an unlimited budget, but it 
was no longer $20,000. There was no specific discussion about 
what the exact price would be. That carried over to discussions 
with Ms. Lamb. Plaintiff and defendant talked also about the 
project and specific costs and timing were not discussed. Each 
party went along without raising the cost and time subject again, 
yet changes made the previous time and cost discussions 
impracticable. Also on October 16, 2001, Richard Lamb wrote a 
check to plaintiff for $3500 as a "progress pay't" for "doors, 
windows & framing" at the Park Meadows property. That adds to the 
court's finding and conclusion about the bathroom addition, 
discussed below. That would have been the only "framing" 
accomplished as replacement of windows and toilets and such does 
not involve framing. Addition of a bathroom does involve 
framing. 
8. After the roofing and painting, plaintiff and Richard 
Lamb agreed plaintiff would do additional work, but no budget 
amount or cap or ceiling was set by the Richard Lamb nor by Ms. 
Lamb. In the past in such matters other than the building of the 
homes, plaintiff had talked with Richard Lamb, given him a 
"guestimate" and then provided an invoice close to that 
"guestimate" and Richard Lamb had paid it, even without a 
detailed invoice or supporting or backup time sheets or materials 
costs. Plaintiffs understanding, based on their past 
relationship of trust they had built, was that Mr. Lamb would pay 
what plaintiff said the work cost. In this instance, plaintiff 
understood some work would be done, in the discretion of the 
Lambs, to improve this rental property, and that this work would 
be on a time and material basis plus 10% profit. There was no 
specific price set for the work to be done as the exact work was 
not agreed upon, it was an ongoing project wherein a rental unit 
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needed various repairs and those evolved as the plaintiff and 
Richard Lamb and defendant agreed. Plaintiff did not believe 
the budget was unlimited, but he did not know what the 
Lambs would exactly want but he believed they would pay for 
the work he did. Plaintiff gave a bid for $4229 for replacement 
of windows and doors. That amount also is found to be on a time 
and material basis. The remainder of the work agreed to was, in 
plaintiff's understanding, on a time plus materials plus 10% 
profit, though there was never a specific discussion or agreement 
as to that. That was based on the course of conduct of the 
parties in the past, though on occasion as above (the exterior 
paint) there was basically a flat fee quoted by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff said he would replace the windows and doors for $4229, 
and Mr. Lamb accepted that amount without discussion as to 
whether it was part of $20,000 or on a time and materials basis. 
That course of conduct and understanding replaced the statements 
of Ms. Lamb from May and August, 2001. Over the next few months 
Dlaintiff and Mr. Lamb and defendant discussed various items to 
Improve within the home and plaintiff did not discuss an exact 
Dayment arrangement nor exact amounts with either of the Lambs. 
Dn October 3, 2001, plaintiff obtained a building permit which 
indicates the permit is for window and door replacement, replace 
)ath sinks and toilets, and repair decking. This became, in the 
/ords of plaintiff's argument, a situation where the "scope" of 
.he work was "creeping" or changing as the project went along, 
"'he court finds that to be true and it thus modified the original 
mderstanding. Even though plaintiff reasonably thought the work 
:ould be done in 3 months in the beginning, as new work was 
liscussed that time changed and became unreasonable. There were 
lelays due to lack of communication which the court finds is not 
he fault of either party, the Olympics themselves delayed 
hings, the frozen and broken pipe discussed below delayed the 
•roject, and the expectations of the parties simply vanished and 
ere lowered due to the course of conduct. 
9. Plaintiff talked with Ms. Lamb on occasion. Richard Lamb 
as ill during this entire time, and after October, 2001, he had 
ittle to do with the project. He eventually passed away in 
uly, 2002, due to congestive heart failure. It is evident to 
he court that these detailed matters of improvements and cost 
ere not discussed amongst the Lambs as they no doubt had more 
mportant things on their minds concerning his health. He was 
ospitalized at various times in the Fall of 2001 and Winter and 
pring of 2002. In a conversation with defendant in the Fall, 
laintiff said he had finished the deck. Ms. Lamb did not 
^lieve that a deck was to be replaced, but she did not say 
lything to plaintiff about it, but she wondered why he had done 
le deck. The court finds that decision to fix the deck was not 
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a unilateral decision by plaintiff but was discussed with Richard 
Lamb. Clearly, from photos and descriptions, that deck was in 
dire circumstances and was a danger and needed replacement or 
destruction. It is not logical that plaintiff would under take, 
on his own, to replace a deck, given the ongoing relationship he 
had with the Lambs who owned multiple rentals in Summit County 
and who, given that plaintiff had built a $650,000 house, could 
provide frequent good paying work to plaintiff. 
10. Plaintiff and defendant also agreed on the addition of a 
third bathroom in the home. She denies that. The court does not 
find defendant is incredible in her denial, but finds it more 
credible that plaintiff would not undertake such a project 
without approval either from her or Mr. Lamb. As discussed, 
plaintiff knew he did not have an unlimited budget, but he also 
knew he could work for the Lambs on other projects. It simply 
makes no sense to the court to believe he would undertake, 
unilaterally, to put in a bathroom in an existing residence where 
none was wanted. This was not a paint color choice, or a light 
fixture choice, it was adding a bathroom, toilet, shower, sink 
and walls, in the middle of an already built house. When 
defendant talked with plaintiff in November, she told him not to 
do it, but she was told by plaintiff he had already framed the 
bathroom by November, 2001. Again, she did not tell him to take 
it out nor dismiss plaintiff, but she testified she did not want 
a bathroom. That course of conduct modified, again, the cost and 
time of this contract. 
11. Ms. Lamb came to the property over Thanksgiving, 2001r 
without Richard Lamb, to see the property and how it was coming. 
She could not get in as plaintiff had replaced the doors, with * 
new locks, and he was not available. She could see inside and 
saw the kitchen sink was gone and she did not understand that had 
been agreed to. She did not do anything to terminate plaintiff, 
however, but kept working with him in the future. 
12. In January, 2002, telephone discussions between 
plaintiff and Ms. Lamb occurred. There was discussion about new 
kitchen vinyl for the floor, kitchen counter tops, and bathroom 
cabinets. Ms. Lamb made clear to plaintiff he was not to change 
the cabinets, but she did not dismiss him or tell him she was not 
going to replace the kitchen flooring or counter tops. She still 
believed the $20,000 budget was in effect, but it was not 
discussed. The court finds that belief unreasonable given the 
scope of the work being done. That is especially so if the court 
considers that the entire project, roofing and painting, was 
involved in the contract. Further, the court finds there was 
simply a novation, a new agreement that modified the time of the 
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contract and the pricing. 
13. In February, 2002, Ms. Lamb returned to Park City. The 
carpet she had purchased in August, 2001, had been installed by 
Mr. Fawson, and she observed the work that had been done on the 
home. The property was not rentable, though she had had a "For 
Rent" sign in the window since August 2001, and had several 
inquiries. However, it was not going to be available until at 
least December 1, 2001 even by her best estimation. She had hoped 
to have it rentable in time for the 2002 Olympics in February, 
2002, but the court finds that was not the agreement after work 
began as it was simply not practical and even if it was 
originally the agreement, the additional new agreements became a 
novation. In February, Ms. Lamb determined to sell the property. 
She put up a "for sale" sign and took down the "for rent" sign. 
She saw the status of the work and did not like most of it but 
again did not dismiss plaintiff. She did not complain about the 
nature nor the scope of the work. Plaintiff indicated there was 
a bill of about $16000 to that date. He testified he sent an 
invoice in January but did not have a copy. She testified she 
did not get an invoice in January. The court makes no finding on 
that issue. However, the court does find that in the February 
2002 meeting it was discussed that there was a bill outstanding 
for some $16,000. Defendant gave plaintiff a check for $5000 on 
February 6, 2002, for "repairs," as noted on the check, at the 
property. She still considered the budget was in effect, though 
Lt was not discussed between Ms. Lamb and plaintiff. Again, she 
iid not question plaintiff- nor tell him he was over budget nor 
iid she dismiss him and tell him to stop work nor did she tell 
lim he was doing things that were unauthorized. 
14. Later in February 2002 plaintiff came to work on the 
>roperty and found a pipe had frozen and broken at the home, 
:hrough no fault of plaintiff or defendant, and caused damage to 
-he home. The water had caused the ceiling and some walls to 
:ollapse and had ruined the floor and carpet. The insurance 
:ompany paid $6351 to defendant to repair the home from that 
iccidental damage. That pipe had been placed, by someone 
>reviously, through an unheated space. Plaintiff offered to do 
he repair work and defendant agreed and told him to go ahead, 
'laintiff hired Joe Lehman to do the plumbing repair and he did 
he remainder as the walls, floor, and ceiling were completely 
amaged. Plaintiff did those repairs and billed for them in May, 
002. 
15. Toward the end of May, 2002, Ms. Lamb returned to Park 
ity. The property was still not rentable though the court 
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finds most of the work was done. There was still no new range or 
microwave in the kitchen and the fireplace was not done, there 
was hardware still to be installed on the doors, some doors 
needed painting, and she did not like the bathroom. Plaintiff 
again as in February walked through the place with Ms. Lamb, and 
she again did not dismiss him. She did not like the work but did 
not complain about it nor indicate it was unauthorized nor tell 
plaintiff there had been in effect a $20,000 budget. The next 
day, plaintiff gave her an invoice for work from December 1, 
2001, to May 1, 2002. The invoice was given May 29, 2002, and 
included the water damage repair work and all other work 
plaintiff had done to that point. It also included what the court 
finds was $1000 worth of work, though not separately listed as 
such, for work done on one of the Three Kings properties. 
Plaintiff was preparing to return to California and they did not 
discuss the invoice. That invoice did not include plaintiff's 
10% profit. Plaintiff sought in that invoice payment in the 
amount of $15,962 (actually $16462 but there was an error in the 
amount of credit, $3000 instead of $3500), and defendant did not 
pay that amount. That amount did not include profit. The court 
finds that is not an indication that the work was for a flat fee, 
nor is it an indication as.plaintiff argues that he was willing 
to forego his fee, but it was an indication only that he did not 
list his profit on his invoice. Later on June 10, 2002, plaintiff 
sent a final invoice seeking $18,774, which amount included the 
10% profit. That was done because plaintiff had not been paid and 
felt perhaps defendant wanted to know the breakout of what was 
labor and material and what was profit. 
16. Probably overlapping in the mail with that June 10 
invoice, plaintiff sent a letter dated June 14, 2002, to 
plaintiff indicating they had agreed to a $20,000 cap and that 
she had paid him and he had done work not authorized. Plaintiff 
did no further work after receipt of that letter and wrote the 
Park City building inspectors in early July, 2002, asking his 
license be removed from the project because of a breach by 
defendant. 
17. Plaintiff filed a notice of claim of lien and recorded 
it on June 19, 2002, in the amount of $18,998. That notice was 
served on defendant June 21, 2002. He complied with all proper 
procedures under the mechanic's lien statutes. The cost of filing 
was $100. That notice includes $1000 for work not done on this 
property but done on Three Kings. 
18. The property was listed for sale from February 2002 
until August, 2002. The property was vacant and not rented from 
May 1, 2001, until September 30, 2002. From January 1, 2000, to 
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April 30, 2001, the property rented for $1600 per month, and 
beginning October 1, 2002, it rented for $1800 per month. 
19. Defendant abandons her claims for breach of covenant of 
good faith and for negligence, her second and third causes of 
action in her counterclaim, and seeks damages only for breach of 
oral contract. 
20. Ms. Lamb returned to Park City in July, 2002. It was 
apparent plaintiff had done nothing since the end-of-May meeting, 
so she undertook to hire others to finish the work. She had 
others install interior door hardware, install light fixtures on 
the interior, install a range and microwave, install furnace 
registers and clothing poles in closets, paint interior doors, 
paint the laundry area and install a door. Defendant also paid 
for an electrician to connect the disposal, paid for others to do 
cleaning, painting the exterior of the property, replacing the 
fireplace, and repairing a leaking shower. Those repairs took 
/arious workmen only a few days to accomplish. She has spent 
funds traveling to Utah and for associated expenses and seeks 
:hose amounts in her counterclaim. She paid the utilities since 
lay 2001, until October, 2002, and seeks reimbursement claiming 
:hose are usually paid by renters. Because the property was not 
rented on July 1, 2002, it was reassessed and the tax valuation 
/ent up and she claims that increased sum as well, contending the 
leal was that the property would be rentable by the 2002 
)lympics. 
22. Defendant has paid plaintiff the sum of $18,255. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
he following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There existed an oral contract between the parties. At 
irst there was a fixed budget with a somewhat fixed time but 
ater there was a novation and the fixed budget was replaced, due 
o the course of dealing between plaintiff and the Lambs, with an 
pen, ongoing project requiring repair and replacement of various 
on-specified items. The set time of the original contract was 
Iso modified. The court does not conclude there was one or two 
ontracts. Whatever the original contract was for, it was 
Ddified and became a novation and each party consented to that 
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new contract by their course of conduct. 
2. Defendant's husband, Richard Lamb, and plaintiff agreed 
that plaintiff would do work and be paid, on a time and materials 
plus 10% profit basis. That agreement became the agreement of 
defendant by the course of conduct, as there was no objection to 
the work done until well after it was done, there was no 
discussion that plaintiff was going above budget, there was no 
discussion he was doing unauthorized work, until defendant 
refused to pay plaintiff. 
3. Plaintiff did work in a satisfactory way, as agreed by 
the Lambs, and has not been paid for that work. That work 
improved the home and plaintiff should be paid for it. Defendant 
breached the modified oral contract between the parties. 
Defendant committed an anticipatory breach of the contract in her 
June 14, 2002, letter, by declaring she was not going to pay the 
invoice. That justified plaintiff in not finishing the job 
though he was able and willing to do so within a reasonable time 
and for a reasonable cost. Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum 
of $19,023, plus interest under statute for the breach of 
contract. 
4. Plaintiff has fully complied with the lien statutes and 
is entitled to a judgment of lien foreclosure but for $1000 less 
than claimed in the notice of lien. Under the lien statutes 
plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and fees, to be 
established by affidavit of counsel. 
6. Plaintiff did not breach the contract and defendant is not 
entitled to recover on her counterclaim for breach of oral 
contract. Plaintiff did not make unilateral, unauthorized 
improvements as to do so would be self-defeating given the past 
work and possible future work with the Lambs. The Lambs had 
always paid what they said they would pay, they had multiple 
properties in Summit County, and there was no reason for 
plaintiff to do unauthorized work. The delays were reasonable 
given the circumstances and were not caused by plaintiff and the 
timing of the work was within the time contemplated by the 
parties and events as they unfolded. 
12 
Plaintiff is to prepare an order and judgment in compliance 
tfith URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
DATED th is
 O^ day of 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 'S&jffincr'*? 
DISTRICT COURT JUDCi*J?Py?L-*, 
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[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT 
PEARSON CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUZANNE J. LAMB, 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 020500636 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: June 16, 2004 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
)efendant's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion 
"or reconsideration. The case was tried to the court on April 15 
md 16 and the court issued its ruling and order on April 20, 
004. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider and objection to 
proposed order in an unauthorized over length memo (URCP, Rule 
(c)(2)) on May 12, 2004. Defendant filed a supplemental motion 
o reconsider on May 26, 2004. Plaintiff opposed the first motion 
o reconsider on May 27, 2004. Plaintiff opposed the 
upplemental motion to reconsider on June 8, 2004. Defendant 
iled an unauthorized over length reply memo with respect to the 
upplemental motion on June 15, 2004, though she filed a motion 
o allow such an over length memo. She also filed a reply memo 
ith respect to the motion to reconsider on June 15, 2004. The 
ourt denies that request though the court has considered the 
eply memo. Defendant filed a notice to submit June 15, 2004. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
ntire file, and concludes as follows. 
The case has been tried. The court did the best it could 
nd rendered its ruling. There is no provision for 
econsideration in our rules of procedure. Defendant raises new 
rguments in the guise of a motion to reconsider in her 
upplemental motion. The argument advanced post-trial was not 
dvanced at trial and is waived. The court believes those are all 
ntimely and are all simply an attempt to convince the court of 
he correctness of defendant's position, which arguments the 
ourt heard and determined at trial. 
Plaintiff asserts that it provided the proposed order to 
efendant on April 21, 2004. The court has not seen the proposed 
rder but if that is true the motion to reconsider and objection 
re not timely. Even if timely, the court rejects the arguments 
as it did at trial. The court ruled as it did. The ruling 
stands on whatever merit it has. If defendant believes the court 
was wrong she is aware of her remedy, and it is not to ask the 
court to retry the matter on pleadings unauthorized over length 
memoranda. The court rejects the arguments of defendant as being 
made in unauthorized over length memos, as being untimely, and on 
the merits for the reasons stated by the court in its ruling and 
for the reasons advanced by plaintiff in the oppositions memos 
relating to these motions. 
The motion to allow an over length memo is denied. The 
motion for reconsideration is denied. The supplemental motion 
for reconsideration is denied. The court will examine the 
proposed order when it is received and if the court believes 
further hearing is necessary it will schedule a hearing. If the 
court believes the proposed order reflects the court's ruling the 
court will sign the order. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of 
"BRUCE C. LUBECK' 
DISTRICT COURT 
\n 
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84145-0898 
Mail DAVE B THOMPSON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
2200 N PARK AVE BLDG D STE 
200 
PO BOX 682800 
PARK CITY UT 84068 
Dated this /^V^day of \JLJA,,_ . , 20_Q±j_. 
(e§ptftj^Court^c\Wk/-' «^ _ 
Paqe 2 (last) ,n1 
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•epared and proposed by: 
WfD M. BENNION (5664) 
ICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE (8870) 
ARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
torneys for Robert Pearson 
le Utah Center 
1 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
st Office Box 45898 
It Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
lephone: (801) 532-1234 
;simile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICUL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BERT PEARSON dba ROBERT PEARSON 
NSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
SANNE J. LAMB, 
Defendant 
^ANNEJ.LAMB 
Counterclaim plaintiff, 
iERT PEARSON dba ROBERT PEARSON 
NSTRUCTION, 
Counterclaim defendant. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020500636 LM 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
COPY 
FILED 
JUL 2 8 2004 
Deputy aierk. Summit County" 
B y •»> ourt 
/2^ 
Pursuant to Rules 7(f) and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based on the 
Memorandum Decision dated April 20, 2004, the Court hereby ORDERS, JUDGES and 
DECREES as follows: 
1. Defendant Suzanne J. Lamb ("Mrs. Lamb") is liable on plaintiff Robert Pearson 
("Mr. Pearson") first cause of action for breach of contract, and judgment is hereby entered in 
favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. Lamb in the amount of $19,023, plus statutory interest 
pursuant at the rate of 10% per annum, commencing July 10, 2002, and continuing until of this 
judgment; 
2. Mr. Pearson has fully complied with the requirements of the Utah Mechanics' Lien 
Act, U.C.A. §§ 38-1-1 et ai, and holds a valid and enforceable mechanics' lien against Mrs. 
Lamb's real property located at 2547 Holiday Ranch Loop Road, Park City, Utah, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
Parcel #PKM-82 
All of Lot 82, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISION #1 
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof as filed in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah. 
A judgment of lien foreclosure is therefore entered in favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. 
Lamb in the amount of $17,998.97, plus interest at the statutory rate of 10% per annum from July 
10, 2002, and continuing until the date of this judgment, plus lien filing fees of $100.00, plus 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $ 42,37937. 
3. Mr. Pearson is not liable on Mrs. Lamb's counterclaim for breach of contract, and 
judgment is entered in favor of Mr. Pearson and against Mrs. Lamb on that claim; 
4. The judgment amounts set forth herein shall continue to accrue interest at the 
atutory legal rate from the date set forth on this judgment until paid in full, and may also be 
igmented by any additional reasonable attorneys' fees and costs necessary to collect the 
dgment. 
DATED this <Ofi day of July, 2004. 
Id BRUCE LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
itfn 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this $0 day of July 2004, I caused to be delivered, via U.S. 
Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing [proposed] FINAL ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT, to: 
David Thompson 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON 
P.O. Box 682800 
2200 North Park Avenue 
Building D. Suite 200 
Park City, UT 84068 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8428 
Attorneys for Suzanne Lamb 
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